

## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 PM-03 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 DODE-00

L-03 EB-07 ACDA-05 MC-02 OMB-01 CIAE-00 INR-07

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O R 311700Z MAY 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USMTM DHAHRAN

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 127422

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, SA, YE, JO

SUBJECT: BRIEFING INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS ON YAR MILITARY  
MODERNIZATION

REFS: (A) AMMAN 3515; (B) STATE 122278

1. FOR EMBASSY AMMAN: IF EMBASSIES JIDDA AND SANA CONCUR,  
YOU MAY BRIEF KING HUSSEIN ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

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A. SAG AND USG ARE DISCUSSING DETAILS OF MILITARY  
ASSISTANCE TO YAR. PRIMARY EMPHASIS, FOR NOW, IS ON  
ARMY DEVELOPMENT, WHICH IS MOST URGENT NEED AND MOST  
EASILY ADDRESSED. HOWEVER, YAR NAVAL AND AIR FORCES ALSO

NEED MODERNIZATION, AND WE EXPECT WILL BE SUBJECT OF SAG-USG CONSULTATIONS IN NEAR FUTURE.

B. USG APPROACH IS STRICTLY IN CONTEXT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION. SAG, WHICH HAS NECESSARY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, SHOULD AND IS TAKING LEAD. U.S. HAS NOT PREPARED A PLAN FOR YAR MILITARY MODERNIZATION, BUT, RATHER, IS PROPOSING VARIOUS STEPS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION OF SAUDI AND YEMENI PLANS.

C. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO DISCUSS WITH OTHERS SPECIFIC DETAILS OF STEPS USG IS PROPOSING TO SAG FOR YAR UNTIL ALL THREE PARTIES HAVE FULLY AGREED. AS STEPS ARE AGREED UPON, USG WILL FULLY BRIEF GOJ.

D. TRAINING IS AS IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN YAR MILITARY MODERNIZATION AS EQUIPMENT. USG (AND SAG) FULLY SUPPORTS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OF 87-MAN JORDANIAN ADVISORY TEAM NOW IN YAR, COMPLIMENTS KING HUSSEIN ON HIS WISE SUPPORT OF THIS PROGRAM, AND WISHES TO ENCOURAGE KING TO CONTINUE PROGRAM. ALL OUR INFORMATION STRONGLY SUGGESTS JORDANIANS ARE HIGHLY POPULAR WITH YEMENI ARMY OFFICERS AND VERY EFFECTIVE. WE ARE MAKING KNOWN THESE POSITIVE VIEWS TO SAG ON JORDANIAN ROLE.

E. JORDANIAN ADVISORS IN YAR HAVE ENABLED YARG LEADERSHIP TO DISPLACE SOVIET ADVISORS FROM KEY AREAS OF ADVISORY INFLUENCE. THIS IS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCTION OF SOVIET POTENTIAL FOR TROUBLEMAKING IN PENINSULA AND AT ENTRANCE TO RED SEA.

F. KING SHOULD BE AWARE THAT PROGRAM OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO YAR TO BE FUNDED BY SAG WILL PROBABLY ENTAIL INCREASED SAUDI MILITARY PRESENCE IN YAR. YEMENIS, JORDANIANS AND U.S. WILL ALL HAVE TO ACCEPT REALITY THAT "HE WHO PAYS THE PIPER CALLS THE TUNE", AT LEAST TO EXTENT THAT SAUDIS INSIST UPON IT. HOWEVER, SINCE ALL ARMS PURCHASES CONFIDENTIAL

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FOR YAR WILL BE BASED ON TRILATERAL YARG-SAG-USG AGREEMENTS, CHANCES OF FRICTION SHOULD BE MINIMIZED. IF AND AS SAUDI FUNDING OF ARMS FOR YAR GROWS, KING HUSSEIN MAY WISH TO INTENSIFY DIALOGUE WITH SAUDIS ON RESPECTIVE JORDANIAN AND SAUDI ROLES IN YAR. USG WILL NOT ENCOURAGE SAUDI ADVISORY ROLE IN YAR BUT WE EXPECT SAUDIS THEMSELVES WILL SEEK A ROLE. OUR ATTITUDE WILL BE TO ACCOMMODATE SAUDI WISHES AND SEEK TO FIND ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED PARTIES. (FYI ONLY. COMMENT: WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE KINDS OF SEVERE FRICTION WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN JORDANIANS AND BRITISH IN OMAN SINCE DISPATCH OF JORDANIAN SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION TO DHOFAR IN MARCH CAN BE AVOIDED - OR AT LEAST MINIMIZED - BETWEEN

JORDANIANS AND SAUDIS IN YAR. END COMMENT.)

G. WE EXPECT THAT U.S. ROLE IN YAR MILITARY MODERNIZATION WILL BE ALMOST ENTIRELY INDIRECT. OTHER THAN SOME TEMPORARY REPEAT TEMPORARY U.S. ADVISORY TEAMS TO ASSIST IN INTRODUCTION OF NEW ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT TO YAR, WE ANTICIPATE NO INCREASE IN U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN YAR

BEYOND PRESENT ONE OFFICER AS DEFENSE ATTACHE.

H. AFTER CONSIDERATION OF NEEDS OF YAR MILITARY MODERNIZATION FOR SOME TWO YEARS, IT APPEARS THAT MOMENT HAS ARRIVED TO EMBARK ON SYSTEMATIC PROGRAM. RELEVANT POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDE: (1) SUCCESS OF REGIME OF LTC. AL-HAMDI IN CONSOLIDATING ITS INTERNAL POLITICAL POSITION, ALONG MODERATE ARAB AND PRO-WESTERN LINES; (2) NEW REGIME IN SAUDI ARABIA WHICH APPEARS ACTIVELY INTERESTED IN YEMENI AFFAIRS AND WHICH - JUST IN RECENT WEEKS - HAS DETERMINED TO FULLY SUPPORT EXISTING MODERATE REPUBLICAN REGIME IN SANA; (3) CONTINUED PDRY INFLEXIBILITY AS TO BASIC MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY GOALS, AS REAFFIRMED AT SIXTH NATIONAL FRONT CONGRESS IN MARCH, DESPITE ATTEMPTS TO GAIN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM ARAB OIL STATES; (4) REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL AND CONSEQUENT ENHANCEMENT OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHERN RED SEA AREA; (5) CONTINUING SOVIET INFLUENCE AND GROWING INSTABILITY ON AFRICAN SIDE OF SOUTHERN RED SEA IN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA; (6) COMPLETION OF NECESSARY STUDIES  
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OF YAR MILITARY NEEDS BY BOTH SAG AND USG.

2. FYI: YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BRIEF KING HUSSEIN ON DETAILS OF WHAT WE RECOMMENDING TO SAUDIS AS REFLECTED IN LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR AKINS TO PRINCE SULTAN (REFTEL B). THIS COULD GET BACK TO SAUDIS AND BE MISUNDERSTOOD AS A FORM OF INDIRECT PRESSURE. AS DETAILS ARE AGREED UPON AMONG SAG, YARG, AND USG, DEPARTMENT WILL AUTHORIZE FURTHER BRIEFINGS.

3. FOR INFORMATION ADDRESSEES: IF EMBASSIES JIDDA AND SANA CONCUR, YOU MAY DRAW ON PARAS 1A, B, C, G AND H TO EXTENT YOU DEEM NECESSARY IN RESPONSE TO HOST GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES; HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD NOT RAISE SUBJECT ON YOUR OWN INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME. AFTER WE HAVE FIRM SAUDI COMMITMENTS, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BRIEF OTHER GOVERNMENTS MORE FULLY. INGERSOLL

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